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Abstract
From a policy point of view, the rapid loss of biodiversity (how ever measured) constitutes an 
urgent  need  to  improve  the  ability  to  forecast  possible  changes  in  biodiversity.  Scenario 
development and modelling are essential tools for studying changes of biodiversity and their 
impacts in order to provide well-founded policy options.  However,  so far no comprehensive 
model has been developed integrating the diverse relevant ecological, economic, individual and 
societal processes. Instead socio-economic, climate and biodiversity models exhibit a wide range 
of  assumptions  concerning  population  development,  economic  growth  and  the  resulting 
pressures on biodiversity. The paper summarises the efforts undertaken in the framework of the 
ALARM project by an interdisciplinary team of economists, climatologists, land use experts and 
modellers. It describes the challenges of such a kind of work, bringing together different world 
views unavoidably inherent to the different fields of investigation.
Keywords:  scenario  development,  econometrics,  narratives,  shocks,  climate  change, 
biodiversity, social impacts, politics.
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1 Introduction
It  seems  improbable  or  at  least  a  matter  of  a  distant  future  that  biodiversity  will  become 
institutionalised as a policy field in its own right, on at least formally equal footing with fiscal, 
foreign or agricultural policy. In order to be effective right now, biodiversity protection needs to 
get  out  of  the  preservation  policy  niche  to  be  effective.  Although  there  is  still  room  for 
improvement  regarding  capacity  building  and  education,  the  key  challenge  is  to  integrate 
biodiversity concerns into the day-to-day working mechanisms of state, business and society. For 
the safeguarding of biodiversity end-of-the-pipe solutions and compensations like establishing 
protected areas is simply not enough, as long as the pressures on biodiversity continue unabated.
Consequently, any effective biodiversity protection strategy must be broadly based, addressing 
production, consumption and administration patterns and attitudes alike, and so must scenarios 
developed  to  derive  efficient  strategies  for  biodiversity  pressure  reduction.  This  requires  a 
paradigm  shift  –  which  is  the  common  ground  for  biodiversity  and  sustainability  policies. 
However, before promising strategies can be developed and be integrated into the sustainability 
context, first the relevant pressures have to be identified in order to properly represent them in 
the scenario narratives and either in the model runs or in their interpretation. Otherwise, the 
scenarios  might  be  consistent  and  interesting,  but  irrelevant  (since  not  permitting  relevant 
conclusions) for biodiversity preservation.
2 Focus on pressures
For effective biodiversity protection policies, pressure reduction must be achieved for all three 
levels of biodiversity,  and thus the relevant pressures have to be identified for each of them 
(Spangenberg, in press). Combining the three lists results in a  biodiversity pressure inventory, 
permitting to identify those pressures which are mentioned more than once as Very Important 
Pressures  (VIPs)  and  to  address  them  in  constructing  the  scenarios  and  deriving  policy 
recommendations. Important analytic instruments for this purpose are “scenarios that describe 
sustainable and unsustainable developments, including unexpected events, changes, and lines of 
fracture” (Martens, 2006, p. 40).
Thus the pressure analysis is but a first step towards policy definition, not yet the solution: for 
the scenarios, the drivers behind the pressures must be identified and used in the modelling for 
projections  into  the  future  and  the  analysis  of  unsustainable  trends.  This  permits  to  derive 
priorities for strategic policy action. For Europe, the main anthropogenic disturbance factors (i.e. 
pressures) have been identified for the three levels of biodiversity (EuroStat, 1999; Spangenberg, 
1999; UNEP, 2002; EEA, 2004; EEA, 2005).
In total, the Very Important Pressures dominating in a combined inventory are:
• Climate impacts (including hydrological changes);
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• Chemicals  (pesticides,  other  persistent  organic  chemicals,  petroleum  products, 
endogenous disruptors, etc);
• Fragmentation (reduction of biotope size and thus of population numbers);
• Biological pollution (deliberately/unconsciously introduced foreign or modified species); 
• Overuse/transformation  (exploiting  biological  resources  beyond  their  regeneration 
capacity).
Each of these pressures is mentioned in at least two of the three lists of key pressures, one for 
each of the three levels of biodiversity. Reducing them is an obvious priority for biodiversity 
protection policies. 
Figure 1: The impact of ecosystem services on human well-being 
2.1 Demarcation
The generation of such pressures is neither intentional nor incidental, but the result of ongoing 
socio-economic  processes  and  policies.  In  the  majority  of  cases,  the  negative  impact  on 
biodiversity has been detected too late (or not at all), and has been dealt with by suggesting 
additive measures for biodiversity protection instead of questioning the basic drivers causing 
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these pressures. As opposed to a species-centred perspective, the justification of policy measures 
rests  implicitly  or  explicitly  on the  functional  attributes  of  the  ecosystem level  (“ecosystem 
services”).  Their  utility  can  be  aesthetic  as  much as  economic,  but  the  general  approach is 
anthropocentric  and  focussed  on  the  short  to  medium term availability  of  such  services,  as 
illustrated in figure 1. 
According  to  the  Millennium  Ecosystem  Assessment  MEA  definition,  they  “include 
provisioning  services  such  as  food,  water,  timber,  and  fibre;  regulating  services  that  affect 
climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, 
aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, 
and nutrient cycling” (Reid, 2002, p. 1-2).
3 Driving forces: the rationale for socio-economic scenarios
The next step of scenario construction is to make sure that the drivers causing the pressures are 
adequately reflected in the  scenario dynamics.  Only then it  is  possible  to  compare different 
scenarios  regarding  their  expected  impacts  on  biodiversity,  and  to  derive  suitable  policy 
suggestions. For this behalf, scenarios must not only be relevant from a biodiversity perspective, 
but also from a policy point of view, i.e. addressing relevant problems with effective means. 
Otherwise they would miss their explicit objective, improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
strategy  proposals  for  making  the  everyday  mechanisms  of  business  and  politics  better 
compatible with biodiversity concerns. In other words: the scenarios must be formulated in the 
language of decision makers at the appropriate level. 
Political and administrative decisions, including those on biodiversity pressure management, are 
taken on the  local,  regional,  national  or  supranational  level,  and they apply within  political 
borders,  not  within  ecological  boundaries.  The  challenge  is  then  to  find  strategies  on  the 
institutionally adequate scale, informed by bioscience analysis, helping to steer decision making 
with  a  sufficient  degree  of  reliability  towards  effective  biodiversity  preservation.  Other 
information is  helpful  to  contextualise  the  message,  but  the  essence  must  refer  to  what  the 
decision makers can influence. 
A systematic analysis of driving forces would ideally be conducted as a participative process 
involving administration and civil society. In the course of such a process, a “Pressure-Policy-
Matrix” would be established, a tool which has been suggested to cross the governmental policy 
domains with identified pressures. The cells of the matrix would contain the relevant policies as 
driving forces; as far as civil society participates, behavioural routines and preferences could be 
listed on their part (Spangenberg, 2005). Combining driving force analysis with bottom-up and 
top-down, forecasting and backcasting scenario techniques, decision support can be provided to 
all relevant levels of decision making, and for all relevant sectors. 
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3.1 Status quo and challenges
So far no comprehensive model has been developed integrating the diverse relevant ecological, 
economic, individual and societal processes linking driving forces, pressures and impacts. This is 
not only due to the overwhelming complexity such a model would have to accommodate, but 
also to different system characteristics like system boundaries and time scales, and the lack of 
knowledge regarding their interactions. Probably, no such integrated model is possible, and what 
could be achieved at best is a group of separate but coupled models. Amongst these, externally 
set assumptions would be harmonised and the results of one used as input to the others. For 
instance, while population development could be based on joint assumptions, growth data from 
an economic model might be used by land use and climate models, which in a next step would 
interact (emissions from land use and climate impacts, respectively). Their results would in turn 
influence the economic modelling exercise by inducing the need for adaptation expenditure or by 
modifying productivities. Obviously, such a process of model harmonisation must be an iterative 
one, implying the need for time and other resources.
Unfortunately, the state of the art is rather far away from this optimal situation. Instead socio-
economic,  climate  and  biodiversity  model  exhibit  a  wide  range  of  assumptions  concerning 
population  development,  economic  growth  and  the  resulting  pressures  on  biodiversity.  The 
IPCC’s SRES scenarios do neither include climate protection policies so far, nor their potential 
effects on economic growth. Consequently, the Millennium Assessment scenarios, which include 
climate  protection policies,  expect  less  and slower  climate  change than the  SRES scenarios 
(which at the same time are considered rather conservative by other sources). Computable global 
equilibrium (CGE) models are frequently used for predictions, but they are unable to reflect the 
structural change which is characteristic to any market economy, in particular in the long run 
(which may be a rather short term view from a climate research perspective). 
Therefore  as  a  first  step  it  is  necessary  to  derive  consistent  assumptions  and  scenario 
interpretations  from  a  comparative  analysis  of  existing  models  and  scenarios  from  several 
disciplines. Assessing their overlaps and the possible contradictions between the results of one 
and the assumptions of other scenarios can help get  a better  assessment of the relevance of 
specific scenario results by contextualising them with the outcome of other modelling exercises. 
Similarities in results can confirm the robustness of the scenarios chosen and that the results are 
not  mere model  or data artefacts,  but  like any sensitivity analysis  they can also raise  doubt 
regarding specific outcomes (see e.g. Bockermann et al.,  2005). This way, a complementary, 
cross-disciplinary  knowledge  base  can  be  developed  in  order  to  support  effective  policy 
decisions and provide a basis for future modelling exercises on all levels. 
4 The ALARM scenarios
Each ALARM scenario  consists  of  a  narrative,  of  which  several  elements  are  quantitatively 
illustrated by different, partly integrated models. The narratives have been drafted by the project 
team and were discussed for their consistency and plausibility with the external stakeholders 
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constituting the ALARM Consultative Forum. Regarding the bioscience relevance, additional 
discussions were with the ALARM partners (comprising 67 scientific institutes and about 250 
scientists).
The  three  scenarios  analysed  cover  a  broad  range  of  social,  economic,  political  and  geo-
biosphere parameters. The BAMBU (Business  As Might  Be  Usual) scenario is what the IPCC 
calls a policy driven one, i.e. a scenario extrapolating the expected trends in EU decision making 
and assessing their sustainability and biodiversity impacts. It  includes climate mitigation and 
adaptation measures and explicit but not radical biodiversity protection policies.
The  two  others  describe  different  policy  orientations  discussed  by  relevant  stakeholders  in 
Europe. GRAS (GRowth Applied Strategy) is a liberal, free-trade, globalisation and deregulation 
scenario. Regarding climate change, its focus is on adaptation rather than mitigation, with some 
limited measures taken to limit climate change. Provisions for biodiversity protection (and other 
environmental problems) are also limited and will only be taken when the problem emerges. The 
scenario  policies  show  no  interest  in  social  and  institutional  sustainability;  economic 
sustainability is interpreted mainly as economic growth. 
SEDG  (Sustainable  European  Development  Goal)  is  a  backcasting  scenario  dedicated  to 
integrated environmental, social, institutional and economic sustainability. Methodologically, it 
is  normative,  designed to meet  specific  goals and deriving the necessary policy measures  to 
achieve  them.  For  illustrating  the  scenarios  in  a  coherent  manner  with  different  simulation 
models, it is necessary to compare and – where necessary – reconcile the model assumptions.
Amongst the SRES scenarios we haven chosen those particularly fitting to the expected climate 
development under the three ALARM scenarios, namely A1FI for GRAS, as both are growth 
scenarios based on a neoliberal policy approach. For both BAMBU and SEDG the choice was 
less obvious, as both include mitigation measures not foreseen under the SRES scenarios. For 
BAMBU we have chosen SRES A2, as this seems to match the past developments which – 
although the emissions in the modelling period will be different – determine the climate trend, 
due to the time lag between emissions and atmospheric warming. For the SEDG scenario, we 
have chosen the one SRES scenario leading to a stabilisation at 550 ppm, the B1 scenario. As 
this is not achieved due to mitigation, but economic problems, the SEDG and the SRES B1 
worlds are significantly different, but share the same climate trajectory. 
In illustrating the narratives, each of these three climate scenarios was discursively combined 
with a narrative-specific run of a spatially explicit land use model disaggregated to the NUTS 3 
level, and with GINFORS, an econometric input-output model. The latter combines economic 
data with energy and material flows, and calculates domestic economic development, resource 
consumption, emissions and employment plus the global trade in some forty categories of goods. 
Although the models used are global ones, the focus of the analysis is Europe, and how changes 
there affect the world (and vice versa).
Economic development trends cannot be spatially disaggregated to a sub-national level based on 
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the  available  data,  but  for  their  impacts  we  have  developed  rules  to  spatially  differentiate 
population density, migration, income disparities and income development. 
4.1 Preliminary results 
The emission trajectories resulting from the econometric model are lower than those assumed in 
the SRES scenarios. Nonetheless no specific corrective factors for the SRES scenarios can be 
suggested, as the deviation of the emission paths will lead to changes in climate effects only 
beyond  the  scenario  perspective:  evolving  input-output  models  (unlike  Computable  Global 
Equilibrium Models CGE, which however underestimate the structural change occurring in the 
medium to long run) cannot be usefully run for more than 20 years, so the time horizon is a 
simulation to 2020 with a projection of some parameters to 2050. However, looking at the SRES 
narratives, it is obvious that the BAMBU and the SEDG scenarios and the economic and land 
use  model  runs  used  to  illustrate  them do not  describe  an  A2 or  a  B1 world,  respectively. 
Developing  climate  scenarios  including  adaptation  and  mitigation,  and  the  socio-economic 
effects thereof thus should be one priority issue for the future climate research at the IPCC level.
The econometric model does not directly take into account the effects of climate change, but is 
the  basis  for  assessing  the  relevance  of  the  potentially  affected  regions  and  sectors.  The 
discussion (part of the narrative) confirms the limited economic impacts of climate change in the 
observation period under the BAMBU scenario. This suits well with other sources expecting 
between 0 and 3% loss of GDP growth over a 50 years period, i.e. the equivalent of 0 to 8 month 
growth  (for  an  overview see  the  Stern  Review,  2006).  Affected  sectors  include forestry (in 
Europe less agriculture), tourism (more structural change than growth impediment) and to some 
degree the construction sector. The impact on biodiversity is mixed: some drivers continue to 
increase  (e.g.  transport),  while  others  become  less  severe  (e.g.  agriculture).  In  the  growth 
scenario, as expected, most drivers become more serious, emissions rise and climate change is 
accelerated.  The  income  distribution  becomes  more  uneven,  and  salaries  stagnate,  but 
unemployment goes down more rapidly than in the other scenarios (a general decline is the result 
of demographic trends). The sustainable development scenario SEDG demonstrates that even a 
radical mitigation policy in Europe will result in nothing more than a delay in global warming of 
a few years, unless other parts of the world follow suit (most important: the USA and the BRICS 
countries, Brasil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). 
The conclusion for climate policy is that as the impacts e.g. on biodiversity,  but also on the 
living conditions in the South are serious, action must be taken and Europe is well advised to be 
a frontrunner. However, international cooperation must make sure that other parts of the world 
follow  suit  in  the  post-Kyoto  phase,  maybe  first  the  Like  Minded  Countries  group  of  the 
renewable energy coalition launched in Johannesburg 2002. A second conclusion is that it is in 
vain to hope that due to cost reasons the market or the business sector would be forced to act on 
their own behalf; instead dedicated political decisions are needed to set the framework right for 
climate mitigation. Adaptation will happen rather easily in the business sector, as the speed of 
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change in the economic system is so much higher than in the bio-geosphere that it can easily 
accommodate these changes of the environment.  However,  in  the infrastructure,  changes are 
much slower and political intervention (regulations, incentives) will be needed.
4.2 Beyond extrapolation: shock scenarios
Besides improving scenarios and solidifying their  results  by comparative analysis,  the limits 
inherent to all these modelling exercises must be assessed. The most important ones result from 
the gradualism, i.e. the internal dynamics of models based on marginal, linear changes, typical 
for simulation exercises. To be policy relevant, however, scenarios have to take the effects of 
non-linear developments into account, in particular if they are singular events with widespread 
consequences, severe enough to change the development trajectory.
One way to deal with them is to develop a variety of shock scenarios against the backdrop of 
linear  simulation  runs,  to  illustrate  how  future  developments  can  be  different  from  any 
extrapolation of past trends. 
The real future will most probably include such shocks, although by their very character we 
cannot predict them, neither which ones will occur nor when this will be the case (nonetheless 
vulnerabilities can be assessed, and precautionary measures can be taken, reducing a probability 
which is not quantifiable). Such shocks could include economic crises, reducing the future rate 
of economic growth as well as the level of economic activity from which the growth is supposed 
to start, social crises like wars, environmental catastrophes (the 2005 tsunami and hurricanes are 
just a point in case), technological breakthroughs with positive or negative effects, and other 
non-predictable events like natural disasters. Thus three additional hazard driven shock scenarios 
were  developed as  deviations  from the  core  scenarios  (see  figure  2),  combining a  narrative 
characterised by the deviation from one of the core scenarios by one disturbance event with long-
term and large-scale impacts. They could only be partly simulated; partly they were developed as 
model-supported semi-quantitative narratives. The three shocks include an environmental (THC 
collapse), an economic (peak oil) and a societal one (pandemia). All these events are possible, 
plausible, but improbable at any given point of time.
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Figure 2: Scenarios and shocks in ALARM
5 Discussion 
For the THC collapse,  since the warming was of  limited economic effect,  so  is  the interim 
cooling (if it materialises after 2050 – nowadays the shock would be significant, but this is not a 
plausible scenario). 
The quadrupling of the oil price first sounds like a safe receipt for an economic disaster, and so it 
is (minus a fifth of the GDP) – for less than five years. Then the economic growth (not the GDP) 
bounces back to the old level (or possibly even more), since due to international trade the money 
that has flown out of the importing countries comes back in form of product orders. As a result, 
the economic damage is limited, but since a high bill has to be paid for imports, the social impact 
is serious, resembling the wave of poverty resulting from the East Asian economic crisis a few 
years ago. What would be the most plausible policy response? For Europe, most probably a 
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massive  investment  in  biofuels  (they can  be  on  the  market  within  a  year,  faster  than  most 
alternatives, they provide fluid fuel, and the strategy is already in place). The expected result is a 
massive pressure on agricultural and forest land, leading to significant losses of biodiversity (as a 
deviation from BAMBU, mainly focussed on domestic biofuel production, the pressure is on the 
European  landscape;  as  a  deviation  from  GRAS,  demand  would  be  covered  by  massive 
expansion of ethanol and palm oil from Brasil and South East Asia, with dangerous impacts on 
the their biodiversity). So what looked like an economic crisis turns out to be a social one, and 
the policies to mitigate it will most probably create an environmental disaster (even if they may 
reduce GHG emissions).
The  pandemia  is  either  an  economic  transformation  with  some  sectors  loosing  and  others 
winning (like health care, pharmaceuticals etc.), with an overall reduction of GDP below 10% 
and an early rebound, or leads to the total collapse of the economy. The latter would be the case 
if about 20% of the population would drop off the production process – some dead or on sick 
leave, but more trying to escape infection by avoiding to all occasions where many people meet, 
i.e. work places, shopping centres, cultural events – or even the cities as such (as observed in the 
bird flue epidemic in China). 
6 Outlook
According to our experience, with the help of the comparative analysis of different scenarios and 
the  illustration  of  some of  their  aspects  by different  models,  and  by using  shock  scenarios 
extending  the  range  of  potentially  possible  futures  taken  into  account  regardless  of  their 
probability, the validity of future projections and the range of future options assessed can be 
significantly  enhanced.  At  the  same  time,  the  analysis  provides  input  for  future  modelling 
exercises, by creating a shared interdisciplinary knowledge based which can be used in future 
scenario development.
In the political domain, this allows to develop strategies and test them regarding their robustness 
in a wide number of possible futures (strategies which prove effective under a variety of different 
futures  can  be  considered  robust  and  if  successful,  a  good  choice  for  sustainability  and 
biodiversity strategies). Such “safe bet” or “no regret” policies are the first choice in situations of 
enduring uncertainty (which in policy making is more often the case than not, in particular with 
respect to long term objectives). 
In  the  scientific  domain,  such an  analysis  provides  input  for  future  modelling  exercises,  by 
creating  a  shared  interdisciplinary  knowledge  based  which  can  be  used  in  future  scenario 
development. It helps to assess the relevance of feedback loops and the robustness of scenario-
based expectations and recommendations.
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